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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - DuTY OF Ho:r-.rn OWNER
To PERMIT HousING INSPECTION WITHOUT A WARRANT - A Dayton, Ohio,
city ordinance1 authorized housing inspectors to inspect any dwelling, without requiring a search warrant, for the purpose of safeguarding the public
health and safety. Acting in compliance with the requirements of this
ordinance, city housing inspectors requested admittance to appellant's home
in order to conduct a health inspection. Appellant refused to permit the
inspectors to enter and inspect his home without a search warrant, and was
therefore arrested and confined for violating the ordinance. Discharge of
appellant in habeas corpus proceedings2 was reversed by the Ohio Court of
Appeals.3 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed by
an equally divided Court, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).4
In determining the protection afforded by the fourth amendment to the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized the right to
search in only two situations: where a search warrant is obtained from a
magistrate,is and where the search is incident to a lawful arrest. 6 After
Wolf v. Colorado,1 in which a unanimous Court stated that the fourteenth
amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers,
it was thought that the Court would treat the protection afforded by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment against unreasonable

1 DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 806-30 (a) (1954) provides: "The
Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the
condition of dwellings •.. located within the City of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty of safeguarding the health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and
of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections and upon showing
appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is hereby authorized to enter, examine
and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings.••• The owner or occupant of every
dwelling ••• shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such dwelling. . . ."
2 In Ohio the constitutionality of an ordinance may be determined in habeas corpus
proceedings when the petitioner is under arrest but has not been tried and convicted.
Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio St. 417, 47 N.E. 50 (1897). The ordinance was held invalid by
the Ohio Court of Common Pleas as a violation of the OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 and the
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is not indicated why the Ohio court considered this a violation
of the fourth, rather than the fourteenth, amendment.
8 State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776 (1957), affd, 168
Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
4 Chief Justice ·warren, and Justices Brennan, Black and Douglas dissented. Mr.
Justice Stewart did not take part in this decision.
IS Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. IO (1948).
6 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Moreover, if the search is
incident to an arrest made without an arrest warrant, the Court will require that the
grounds for lawful arrest exist prior to the search. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959). But see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 24 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1926),
where the Court upheld the right to search an automobile independent of a lawful arrest where there existed reasonable grounds to believe the automobile was being used to
commit a misdemeanor by transporting contraband. The Court recognized this limited
exception because of the impractic:ibility of securing a warrant to search a vehicle which
might be removed from the jurisdiction while the police were obtaining a warrant.
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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searches qualitatively the same as it had treated that protection under the
fourth amendment.a
In Frank v. Maryland,9 however, the Court departed from these standards
to uphold a city ordinance authorizing inspections of private homes by
health inspectors, where the ordinance did not require the inspectors to
obtain a search warrant. At least four of the Justices10 in the majority in
Frank appeared to ignore the approach suggested by Wolf and, instead, to
apply the traditional due process test of weighing the interest of the individual
in his privacy against the interest of the state in maintaining adequate
health and safety standards. They considered the following factors to be
relevant: the long history of authorized health inspections without warrants;11 the provisions of the ordinance 12 which required that the health inspectors have reason to suspect that a nuisance exists before the inspection
is made,13 and that the inspection be made at a reasonable hour;14 the
fact that no evidence for a criminal prosecution was being sought;15 and
the fact that the ordinance did not authorize inspections where the occupant
was unwilling to allow the inspectors to enter.1 6 In the light of these factors
the Court considered that the interest of the public in its health and safety
outweighed the slight restrictions placed on appellant's privacy by allowing
inspections without a warrant.17 In the principal case four Justices1 8 considered the present case to be "controlled" by Frank.19 Thus, although the
s See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (dissenting opinion). This interpretation of Wolf is also taken by CORWIN, THE CONSTITIITION OF THE UNITED STATES
830 (1953). However, the Court has generally agreed that the fourteenth amendment does
not incorporate all of the first eight amendments. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947). See generally RonsCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w 741-42 (1939). See also Handler,
The Fourth Amendment, Federalism, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8 SYRACUSE L. REv. 166
(1957). Compare District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. I (1950), declaring a District of Columbia ordinance similar to
the one in the principal case unconstitutional as a violation of the fourth amendment.
9 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
10 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Stewart. Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred.
11 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 9, at 367-73.
12 BALTIMORE, Mn., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950).
13 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 9, at 366.
14Jbid.
15Ibid.
16Jd. at 367.
17 The Court in the Frank case also considered the subsidiary problem whether a warrant could legally be obtained if one were required. The Court feared either that it
could not be obtained because of the strict constitutional requirements regulating their
issuance, or that those requirements would thereby be lowered. Both alternatives were
unsatisfactory to the Court-the first because it would greatly impair the efficiency of the
inspection program, and the second because it would be constitutionally unacceptable.
Id. at 373. However, if the searclI itself did not violate any constitutional rights or lower
any constitutional standards, it is difficult to see why the issuance of a warrant to make
suclI a searclI should do so. See generally Comment, 44 MINN. L. REv. 513, 531-32 nn. 66
S: 67, where the author concludes from interviews with various directors of housing inspection that requiring warrants for entry into private homes would pose no serious
threat to community health.
18 Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker.
19 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 248 (1959).
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Court in the present case was equally divided, this case plays an important
role in delineating the factors which were considered significant in upholding the ordinance in Frank. Although the ordinance in the principal case
provides substantially heavier penalties for its violation than did the ordinance in Frank, 20 the principal distinction appears to be that the ordinance
did not require as a condition of inspection that valid grounds exist for
suspecting a nuisance. 21 Therefore, if a majority of the Court in the future
does in fact hold that circumstances like those in the present case are controlled by the Frank decision, this would represent a substantial relaxation
of the standards formulated by the Frank decision.
If the foregoing interpretation of the effect of the principal case is
valid, interesting problems may be raised under an ordinance similar to
that in the principal case by the following hypothetical situations: (I) where
the ordinance imposes criminal rather than civil penalties; 22 (2) where the
search is originally conducted for bona fide health purposes, but the evidence thus obtained is later introduced in any criminal proceedings; 2 3
and (3) where a health inspection is conducted as a mere facade for obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. If the Court is to be
consistent, it will apply the traditional due process "balancing of interest"
test to all three situations. Under this test it would be difficult to generalize

20 Compare DAYTON, OHIO, CoDE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 806-83 (1954), which
provides for penalties up to a $200 fine and thirty days' confinement, with BALTIMORE,
MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950), which provides for a fine of only twenty dollars.
21 The ordinance involved in the principal case is quoted in note I supra. The
ordinance involved in the Frank case provided: ""Whenever the Commissioner of Health
shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house • • • he may demand
entry therein in the day time... _.. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950).
And, compare the facts in Frank, where the attempted inspection was made pursuant to
a specific complaint of rats in the neighborhood, and the condition of the premises were
in "an extreme state of decay," id. at 361, with the facts in the principal case, where no
evidence was presented pertaining to the reason for the attempted inspection, and the
appellant's home was said to be in a "good, clean, safe, and sanitary condition." State
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 105 Ohio App. 376, 377, 152 N.E.2d 776 (1957).
22 The answer to the question what is a "civil" and what is a "criminal" penalty remains uncertain. The majority of the state courts take the view that violation of an
ordinance cannot constitute a crime. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 1 (5th ed. 1952). However, some courts have held that a violation of a municipal ordinance designed to protect
health and safety is a crime. MILLER, CRIMINAL LA.w § 12 (1934). If in fact this is an
essential factor in the interpretation of the constitutionality of the ordinance, it would seem
that the Supreme Court will be forced to disregard the labels attached to a penalty by the
states and establish its own criterion.
23 In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 236 (1960), the Court held that under the
fourth amendment a government official acting under an administrative arrest warrant has
as much justification to search as does a police officer making a lawful arrest. Evidence
found is thus admissible in a criminal trial not connected with the original arrest. Since
the requirements of due process under the fourteenth amendment are not more stringent
than those imposed by the fourth amendment, it would seem that the same logic could be
applied to evidence discovered by city health inspectors in the process of their inspections.
However, it should be pointed out that the physical area of permissible search under an
arrest warrant is probably much more restricted than that allowed for purposes of health
inspection. See generally Note, 59 MICH. L. REv. 310 (1960).
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as to the outcome of the first two situations.24

However, in the third situation, the fact that there was no bona fide health inspection should cause the
search to be violative of the due process clause since the interest of the public
in safeguarding its health would not then be available to offset the interest
of the individual in his privacy.21>
Hereafter, a home owner, when confronted by an official purporting to
conduct a health inspection, will be compelled to make one of two choices.
He may refuse entry, and thereby subject himself to rather severe penalties
if the official is in fact conducting such an inspection. Or he may permit
entry, and thereby subject himself to the possibility of criminal prosecution
resulting from the discovery by that official of evidence of criminal activity.
Neither of these seems to give the home owner a satisfactory alternative.28
Joseph

J. Schneider

23 supra.
Pettiford, Sup. Bench Balt. City, Dec. 16, 1959, the court was
presented with just such a situation and held that the rule in the FTank case could not
be used to to justify such a search. But it should be recognized that difficult problems of
proof will be encountered in seeking to establish that the "health inspection" in any
particular case is, in fact, a mere facade.
26 If the official is not actually carrying on a bona fide inspection, and such action is
declared unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the only recourse open to the home owner will be a civil action against the official
for trespass, a remedy generally considered unsatisfactory. Only if the discovered evidence is used in a prosecution for a federal crime, or for a state crime in a state which
has adopted the "exclusionary rule" (a rule of evidence which excludes from criminal
prosecutions evidence obtained in violation of the restraints against unreasonable searches
and seizures), will the criminal prosecution based solely on the acquired evidence be dismissed against the home owner.
24 See notes 22 and
25 In Maryland v.

